verify_data: always decompress and call assert_id(), see #7362

This commit is contained in:
Thomas Waldmann 2023-02-19 21:25:24 +01:00
parent fea630027c
commit 74a19ee2a0
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 243ACFA951F78E01
1 changed files with 4 additions and 8 deletions

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@ -1837,12 +1837,6 @@ class ArchiveChecker:
chunks_count_index = len(self.chunks)
chunks_count_segments = 0
errors = 0
# for the new crypto, derived from AEADKeyBase, we know that it checks authenticity on
# the crypto.low_level level - invalid chunks will fail to AEAD authenticate.
# for these key types, we know that there is no need to decompress the data afterwards.
# for all other modes, we assume that we must decompress, so we can verify authenticity
# based on the plaintext MAC (via calling ._assert_id(id, plaintext)).
decompress = not isinstance(self.key, AEADKeyBase)
defect_chunks = []
pi = ProgressIndicatorPercent(
total=chunks_count_index, msg="Verifying data %6.2f%%", step=0.01, msgid="check.verify_data"
@ -1872,7 +1866,8 @@ class ArchiveChecker:
chunk_data_iter = self.repository.get_many(chunk_ids)
else:
try:
self.repo_objs.parse(chunk_id, encrypted_data, decompress=decompress)
# we must decompress, so it'll call assert_id() in there:
self.repo_objs.parse(chunk_id, encrypted_data, decompress=True)
except IntegrityErrorBase as integrity_error:
self.error_found = True
errors += 1
@ -1903,7 +1898,8 @@ class ArchiveChecker:
# from the underlying media.
try:
encrypted_data = self.repository.get(defect_chunk)
self.repo_objs.parse(defect_chunk, encrypted_data, decompress=decompress)
# we must decompress, so it'll call assert_id() in there:
self.repo_objs.parse(defect_chunk, encrypted_data, decompress=True)
except IntegrityErrorBase:
# failed twice -> get rid of this chunk
del self.chunks[defect_chunk]