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consider repokey w/o passphrase == unencrypted
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parent
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commit
d964101eb5
4 changed files with 41 additions and 1 deletions
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@ -128,6 +128,15 @@ The best check that everything is ok is to run a dry-run extraction::
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Changelog
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=========
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Version 1.1.0b6 (unreleased)
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----------------------------
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Compatibility notes:
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- Repositories in a repokey mode with a blank passphrase are now treated
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as unencrypted repositories for security checks
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(e.g. BORG_UNKNOWN_UNENCRYPTED_REPO_ACCESS_IS_OK).
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Version 1.1.0b5 (2017-04-30)
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----------------------------
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@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ class SecurityManager:
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self.save(manifest, key, cache)
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def assert_access_unknown(self, warn_if_unencrypted, key):
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if warn_if_unencrypted and isinstance(key, PlaintextKey) and not self.known():
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if warn_if_unencrypted and not key.passphrase_protected and not self.known():
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msg = ("Warning: Attempting to access a previously unknown unencrypted repository!\n" +
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"Do you want to continue? [yN] ")
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if not yes(msg, false_msg="Aborting.", invalid_msg="Invalid answer, aborting.",
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@ -234,6 +234,7 @@ class PlaintextKey(KeyBase):
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STORAGE = KeyBlobStorage.NO_STORAGE
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chunk_seed = 0
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passphrase_protected = False
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def __init__(self, repository):
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super().__init__(repository)
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@ -329,6 +330,8 @@ class AESKeyBase(KeyBase):
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MAC = hmac_sha256
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passphrase_protected = True
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def encrypt(self, chunk):
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data = self.compressor.compress(chunk)
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self.nonce_manager.ensure_reservation(num_aes_blocks(len(data)))
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@ -700,6 +703,10 @@ class RepoKey(ID_HMAC_SHA_256, KeyfileKeyBase):
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return self.repository
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def load(self, target, passphrase):
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# While the repository is encrypted, we consider a repokey repository with a blank
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# passphrase an unencrypted repository.
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self.passphrase_protected = passphrase != ''
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# what we get in target is just a repo location, but we already have the repo obj:
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target = self.repository
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key_data = target.load_key()
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@ -710,6 +717,7 @@ class RepoKey(ID_HMAC_SHA_256, KeyfileKeyBase):
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return success
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def save(self, target, passphrase):
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self.passphrase_protected = passphrase != ''
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key_data = self._save(passphrase)
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key_data = key_data.encode('utf-8') # remote repo: msgpack issue #99, giving bytes
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target.save_key(key_data)
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@ -607,6 +607,29 @@ class ArchiverTestCase(ArchiverTestCaseBase):
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with pytest.raises(Cache.RepositoryAccessAborted):
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self.cmd('create', self.repository_location + '_encrypted::test.2', 'input')
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def test_repository_swap_detection_repokey_blank_passphrase(self):
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# Check that a repokey repo with a blank passphrase is considered like a plaintext repo.
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self.create_test_files()
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# User initializes her repository with her passphrase
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self.cmd('init', '--encryption=repokey', self.repository_location)
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self.cmd('create', self.repository_location + '::test', 'input')
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# Attacker replaces it with her own repository, which is encrypted but has no passphrase set
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shutil.rmtree(self.repository_path)
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with environment_variable(BORG_PASSPHRASE=''):
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self.cmd('init', '--encryption=repokey', self.repository_location)
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# Delete cache & security database, AKA switch to user perspective
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self.cmd('delete', '--cache-only', self.repository_location)
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repository_id = bin_to_hex(self._extract_repository_id(self.repository_path))
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shutil.rmtree(get_security_dir(repository_id))
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with environment_variable(BORG_PASSPHRASE=None):
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# This is the part were the user would be tricked, e.g. she assumes that BORG_PASSPHRASE
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# is set, while it isn't. Previously this raised no warning,
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# since the repository is, technically, encrypted.
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if self.FORK_DEFAULT:
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self.cmd('create', self.repository_location + '::test.2', 'input', exit_code=EXIT_ERROR)
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else:
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self.assert_raises(Cache.CacheInitAbortedError, lambda: self.cmd('create', self.repository_location + '::test.2', 'input'))
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def test_repository_move(self):
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self.cmd('init', '--encryption=repokey', self.repository_location)
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repository_id = bin_to_hex(self._extract_repository_id(self.repository_path))
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