remove a lot of complexity from the code that was just there to
support legacy borg versions < 1.0.9 which did not TAM authenticate
the manifest.
since then, borg writes TAM authentication to the manifest,
even if the repo is unencrypted.
if the repo is unencrypted, it did not check the somehow pointless
authentication that was generated without any secret, but
if we add that fake TAM, we can also verify the fake TAM.
if somebody explicitly switches off all crypto, they can not
expect authentication.
for everybody else, borg now always generates the TAM and also
verifies it.
One cannot "to not x", but one can "not to x".
Avoiding split infinitives gives the added bonus that machine
translation yields better results.
setup (n/adj) vs set(v) up. We don't "I setup it" but "I set it up".
Likewise for login(n/adj) and log(v) in, backup(n/adj) and back(v) up.
borg < 2:
obj = encrypted(compressed(data))
borg 2:
obj = enc_meta_len32 + encrypted(msgpacked(meta)) + encrypted(compressed(data))
handle compr / decompr in repoobj
move the assert_id call from decrypt to RepoObj.parse
also:
- for AEADKeyBase, add a dummy assert_id (not needed here)
- only test assert_id for other if not AEADKeyBase instance
- remove test_getting_wrong_chunk. assert_id is called elsewhere
and is not needed any more anyway with the new AEAD crypto.
- only give manifest (includes key, repo, repo_objs)
- only return manifest from Manifest.load (includes key, repo, repo_objs)