mirror of
https://github.com/borgbackup/borg.git
synced 2024-12-26 17:57:59 +00:00
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100 lines
No EOL
3.8 KiB
HTML
.. IMPORTANT: this file is auto-generated from borg's built-in help, do not edit!
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.. _borg_init:
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borg init
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---------
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::
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borg init <options> REPOSITORY
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positional arguments
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REPOSITORY
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repository to create
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optional arguments
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``-e``, ``--encryption``
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| select encryption key mode
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``-a``, ``--append-only``
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| create an append-only mode repository
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`Common options`_
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Description
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~~~~~~~~~~~
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This command initializes an empty repository. A repository is a filesystem
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directory containing the deduplicated data from zero or more archives.
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Encryption can be enabled at repository init time.
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It is not recommended to work without encryption. Repository encryption protects
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you e.g. against the case that an attacker has access to your backup repository.
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But be careful with the key / the passphrase:
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If you want "passphrase-only" security, use one of the repokey modes. The
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key will be stored inside the repository (in its "config" file). In above
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mentioned attack scenario, the attacker will have the key (but not the
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passphrase).
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If you want "passphrase and having-the-key" security, use one of the keyfile
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modes. The key will be stored in your home directory (in .config/borg/keys).
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In the attack scenario, the attacker who has just access to your repo won't
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have the key (and also not the passphrase).
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Make a backup copy of the key file (keyfile mode) or repo config file
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(repokey mode) and keep it at a safe place, so you still have the key in
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case it gets corrupted or lost. Also keep the passphrase at a safe place.
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The backup that is encrypted with that key won't help you with that, of course.
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Make sure you use a good passphrase. Not too short, not too simple. The real
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encryption / decryption key is encrypted with / locked by your passphrase.
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If an attacker gets your key, he can't unlock and use it without knowing the
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passphrase.
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Be careful with special or non-ascii characters in your passphrase:
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- Borg processes the passphrase as unicode (and encodes it as utf-8),
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so it does not have problems dealing with even the strangest characters.
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- BUT: that does not necessarily apply to your OS / VM / keyboard configuration.
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So better use a long passphrase made from simple ascii chars than one that
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includes non-ascii stuff or characters that are hard/impossible to enter on
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a different keyboard layout.
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You can change your passphrase for existing repos at any time, it won't affect
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the encryption/decryption key or other secrets.
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Encryption modes
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++++++++++++++++
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`repokey` and `keyfile` use AES-CTR-256 for encryption and HMAC-SHA256 for
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authentication in an encrypt-then-MAC (EtM) construction. The chunk ID hash
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is HMAC-SHA256 as well (with a separate key).
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These modes are compatible with borg 1.0.x.
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`repokey-blake2` and `keyfile-blake2` are also authenticated encryption modes,
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but use BLAKE2b-256 instead of HMAC-SHA256 for authentication. The chunk ID
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hash is a keyed BLAKE2b-256 hash.
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These modes are new and *not* compatible with borg 1.0.x.
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`authenticated` mode uses no encryption, but authenticates repository contents
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through the same keyed BLAKE2b-256 hash as the other blake2 modes (it uses it
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as chunk ID hash). The key is stored like repokey.
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This mode is new and not compatible with borg 1.0.x.
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`none` mode uses no encryption and no authentication. It uses sha256 as chunk
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ID hash. Not recommended, rather consider using an authenticated or
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authenticated/encrypted mode.
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This mode is compatible with borg 1.0.x.
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Hardware acceleration will be used automatically.
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On modern Intel/AMD CPUs (except very cheap ones), AES is usually
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hardware-accelerated. BLAKE2b is faster than SHA256 on Intel/AMD 64bit CPUs,
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which makes `authenticated` faster than `none`.
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On modern ARM CPUs, NEON provides hardware acceleration for SHA256 making it faster
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than BLAKE2b-256 there. |