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borg/src/borg/crypto/key.py

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import configparser
import getpass
import os
import sys
import textwrap
from binascii import a2b_base64, b2a_base64, hexlify
from hashlib import sha256, sha512, pbkdf2_hmac
from hmac import HMAC, compare_digest
import msgpack
from borg.logger import create_logger
logger = create_logger()
from ..constants import * # NOQA
from ..compress import Compressor
from ..helpers import StableDict
from ..helpers import Error, IntegrityError
from ..helpers import yes
from ..helpers import get_keys_dir, get_security_dir
from ..helpers import bin_to_hex
from ..item import Key, EncryptedKey
from ..platform import SaveFile
from .nonces import NonceManager
from .low_level import AES, bytes_to_long, bytes_to_int, num_aes_blocks, hmac_sha256, blake2b_256, hkdf_hmac_sha512
PREFIX = b'\0' * 8
class PassphraseWrong(Error):
"""passphrase supplied in BORG_PASSPHRASE is incorrect"""
class PasswordRetriesExceeded(Error):
"""exceeded the maximum password retries"""
class UnsupportedPayloadError(Error):
"""Unsupported payload type {}. A newer version is required to access this repository."""
class UnsupportedManifestError(Error):
"""Unsupported manifest envelope. A newer version is required to access this repository."""
class KeyfileNotFoundError(Error):
"""No key file for repository {} found in {}."""
class KeyfileInvalidError(Error):
"""Invalid key file for repository {} found in {}."""
class KeyfileMismatchError(Error):
"""Mismatch between repository {} and key file {}."""
class RepoKeyNotFoundError(Error):
"""No key entry found in the config of repository {}."""
class TAMRequiredError(IntegrityError):
__doc__ = textwrap.dedent("""
Manifest is unauthenticated, but it is required for this repository.
This either means that you are under attack, or that you modified this repository
with a Borg version older than 1.0.9 after TAM authentication was enabled.
In the latter case, use "borg upgrade --tam --force '{}'" to re-authenticate the manifest.
""").strip()
traceback = False
class TAMInvalid(IntegrityError):
__doc__ = IntegrityError.__doc__
traceback = False
def __init__(self):
# Error message becomes: "Data integrity error: Manifest authentication did not verify"
super().__init__('Manifest authentication did not verify')
class TAMUnsupportedSuiteError(IntegrityError):
"""Could not verify manifest: Unsupported suite {!r}; a newer version is needed."""
traceback = False
class KeyBlobStorage:
NO_STORAGE = 'no_storage'
KEYFILE = 'keyfile'
REPO = 'repository'
def key_creator(repository, args):
for key in AVAILABLE_KEY_TYPES:
if key.ARG_NAME == args.encryption:
return key.create(repository, args)
else:
raise ValueError('Invalid encryption mode "%s"' % args.encryption)
def identify_key(manifest_data):
key_type = manifest_data[0]
if key_type == PassphraseKey.TYPE:
# we just dispatch to repokey mode and assume the passphrase was migrated to a repokey.
# see also comment in PassphraseKey class.
return RepoKey
for key in AVAILABLE_KEY_TYPES:
if key.TYPE == key_type:
return key
else:
raise UnsupportedPayloadError(key_type)
def key_factory(repository, manifest_data):
return identify_key(manifest_data).detect(repository, manifest_data)
def tam_required_file(repository):
security_dir = get_security_dir(bin_to_hex(repository.id))
return os.path.join(security_dir, 'tam_required')
def tam_required(repository):
file = tam_required_file(repository)
return os.path.isfile(file)
class KeyBase:
TYPE = None # override in subclasses
# Human-readable name
NAME = 'UNDEFINED'
# Name used in command line / API (e.g. borg init --encryption=...)
ARG_NAME = 'UNDEFINED'
# Storage type (no key blob storage / keyfile / repo)
STORAGE = KeyBlobStorage.NO_STORAGE
def __init__(self, repository):
self.TYPE_STR = bytes([self.TYPE])
self.repository = repository
self.target = None # key location file path / repo obj
# Some commands write new chunks (e.g. rename) but don't take a --compression argument. This duplicates
# the default used by those commands who do take a --compression argument.
self.compressor = Compressor('lz4')
self.decompress = self.compressor.decompress
self.tam_required = True
def id_hash(self, data):
"""Return HMAC hash using the "id" HMAC key
"""
def encrypt(self, chunk):
pass
def decrypt(self, id, data, decompress=True):
pass
def assert_id(self, id, data):
if id:
id_computed = self.id_hash(data)
if not compare_digest(id_computed, id):
raise IntegrityError('Chunk %s: id verification failed' % bin_to_hex(id))
def _tam_key(self, salt, context):
return hkdf_hmac_sha512(
ikm=self.id_key + self.enc_key + self.enc_hmac_key,
salt=salt,
info=b'borg-metadata-authentication-' + context,
output_length=64
)
def pack_and_authenticate_metadata(self, metadata_dict, context=b'manifest'):
metadata_dict = StableDict(metadata_dict)
tam = metadata_dict['tam'] = StableDict({
'type': 'HKDF_HMAC_SHA512',
'hmac': bytes(64),
'salt': os.urandom(64),
})
packed = msgpack.packb(metadata_dict, unicode_errors='surrogateescape')
tam_key = self._tam_key(tam['salt'], context)
tam['hmac'] = HMAC(tam_key, packed, sha512).digest()
return msgpack.packb(metadata_dict, unicode_errors='surrogateescape')
def unpack_and_verify_manifest(self, data, force_tam_not_required=False):
"""Unpack msgpacked *data* and return (object, did_verify)."""
if data.startswith(b'\xc1' * 4):
# This is a manifest from the future, we can't read it.
raise UnsupportedManifestError()
tam_required = self.tam_required
if force_tam_not_required and tam_required:
logger.warning('Manifest authentication DISABLED.')
tam_required = False
data = bytearray(data)
# Since we don't trust these bytes we use the slower Python unpacker,
# which is assumed to have a lower probability of security issues.
unpacked = msgpack.fallback.unpackb(data, object_hook=StableDict, unicode_errors='surrogateescape')
if b'tam' not in unpacked:
if tam_required:
raise TAMRequiredError(self.repository._location.canonical_path())
else:
logger.debug('TAM not found and not required')
return unpacked, False
tam = unpacked.pop(b'tam', None)
if not isinstance(tam, dict):
raise TAMInvalid()
tam_type = tam.get(b'type', b'<none>').decode('ascii', 'replace')
if tam_type != 'HKDF_HMAC_SHA512':
if tam_required:
raise TAMUnsupportedSuiteError(repr(tam_type))
else:
logger.debug('Ignoring TAM made with unsupported suite, since TAM is not required: %r', tam_type)
return unpacked, False
tam_hmac = tam.get(b'hmac')
tam_salt = tam.get(b'salt')
if not isinstance(tam_salt, bytes) or not isinstance(tam_hmac, bytes):
raise TAMInvalid()
offset = data.index(tam_hmac)
data[offset:offset + 64] = bytes(64)
tam_key = self._tam_key(tam_salt, context=b'manifest')
calculated_hmac = HMAC(tam_key, data, sha512).digest()
if not compare_digest(calculated_hmac, tam_hmac):
raise TAMInvalid()
logger.debug('TAM-verified manifest')
return unpacked, True
class PlaintextKey(KeyBase):
TYPE = 0x02
NAME = 'plaintext'
ARG_NAME = 'none'
STORAGE = KeyBlobStorage.NO_STORAGE
chunk_seed = 0
def __init__(self, repository):
super().__init__(repository)
self.tam_required = False
@classmethod
def create(cls, repository, args):
logger.info('Encryption NOT enabled.\nUse the "--encryption=repokey|keyfile" to enable encryption.')
return cls(repository)
@classmethod
def detect(cls, repository, manifest_data):
return cls(repository)
def id_hash(self, data):
return sha256(data).digest()
def encrypt(self, chunk):
data = self.compressor.compress(chunk)
return b''.join([self.TYPE_STR, data])
def decrypt(self, id, data, decompress=True):
if data[0] != self.TYPE:
id_str = bin_to_hex(id) if id is not None else '(unknown)'
raise IntegrityError('Chunk %s: Invalid encryption envelope' % id_str)
payload = memoryview(data)[1:]
if not decompress:
return payload
data = self.decompress(payload)
self.assert_id(id, data)
return data
def _tam_key(self, salt, context):
return salt + context
def random_blake2b_256_key():
# This might look a bit curious, but is the same construction used in the keyed mode of BLAKE2b.
# Why limit the key to 64 bytes and pad it with 64 nulls nonetheless? The answer is that BLAKE2b
# has a 128 byte block size, but only 64 bytes of internal state (this is also referred to as a
# "local wide pipe" design, because the compression function transforms (block, state) => state,
# and len(block) >= len(state), hence wide.)
# In other words, a key longer than 64 bytes would have simply no advantage, since the function
# has no way of propagating more than 64 bytes of entropy internally.
# It's padded to a full block so that the key is never buffered internally by blake2b_update, ie.
# it remains in a single memory location that can be tracked and could be erased securely, if we
# wanted to.
return os.urandom(64) + bytes(64)
class ID_BLAKE2b_256:
"""
Key mix-in class for using BLAKE2b-256 for the id key.
The id_key length must be 32 bytes.
"""
def id_hash(self, data):
return blake2b_256(self.id_key, data)
def init_from_random_data(self, data=None):
assert data is None # PassphraseKey is the only caller using *data*
super().init_from_random_data()
self.enc_hmac_key = random_blake2b_256_key()
self.id_key = random_blake2b_256_key()
class ID_HMAC_SHA_256:
"""
Key mix-in class for using HMAC-SHA-256 for the id key.
The id_key length must be 32 bytes.
"""
def id_hash(self, data):
return hmac_sha256(self.id_key, data)
class AESKeyBase(KeyBase):
"""Common base class shared by KeyfileKey and PassphraseKey
Chunks are encrypted using 256bit AES in Counter Mode (CTR)
Payload layout: TYPE(1) + HMAC(32) + NONCE(8) + CIPHERTEXT
To reduce payload size only 8 bytes of the 16 bytes nonce is saved
in the payload, the first 8 bytes are always zeros. This does not
affect security but limits the maximum repository capacity to
only 295 exabytes!
"""
PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD = 1 + 32 + 8 # TYPE + HMAC + NONCE
MAC = hmac_sha256
def encrypt(self, chunk):
data = self.compressor.compress(chunk)
self.nonce_manager.ensure_reservation(num_aes_blocks(len(data)))
self.enc_cipher.reset()
data = b''.join((self.enc_cipher.iv[8:], self.enc_cipher.encrypt(data)))
assert (self.MAC is blake2b_256 and len(self.enc_hmac_key) == 128 or
self.MAC is hmac_sha256 and len(self.enc_hmac_key) == 32)
hmac = self.MAC(self.enc_hmac_key, data)
return b''.join((self.TYPE_STR, hmac, data))
def decrypt(self, id, data, decompress=True):
if not (data[0] == self.TYPE or
data[0] == PassphraseKey.TYPE and isinstance(self, RepoKey)):
id_str = bin_to_hex(id) if id is not None else '(unknown)'
raise IntegrityError('Chunk %s: Invalid encryption envelope' % id_str)
data_view = memoryview(data)
hmac_given = data_view[1:33]
assert (self.MAC is blake2b_256 and len(self.enc_hmac_key) == 128 or
self.MAC is hmac_sha256 and len(self.enc_hmac_key) == 32)
hmac_computed = memoryview(self.MAC(self.enc_hmac_key, data_view[33:]))
if not compare_digest(hmac_computed, hmac_given):
id_str = bin_to_hex(id) if id is not None else '(unknown)'
raise IntegrityError('Chunk %s: Encryption envelope checksum mismatch' % id_str)
self.dec_cipher.reset(iv=PREFIX + data[33:41])
payload = self.dec_cipher.decrypt(data_view[41:])
if not decompress:
return payload
data = self.decompress(payload)
self.assert_id(id, data)
return data
def extract_nonce(self, payload):
if not (payload[0] == self.TYPE or
payload[0] == PassphraseKey.TYPE and isinstance(self, RepoKey)):
raise IntegrityError('Manifest: Invalid encryption envelope')
nonce = bytes_to_long(payload[33:41])
return nonce
def init_from_random_data(self, data=None):
if data is None:
data = os.urandom(100)
self.enc_key = data[0:32]
self.enc_hmac_key = data[32:64]
self.id_key = data[64:96]
self.chunk_seed = bytes_to_int(data[96:100])
# Convert to signed int32
if self.chunk_seed & 0x80000000:
self.chunk_seed = self.chunk_seed - 0xffffffff - 1
def init_ciphers(self, manifest_nonce=0):
self.enc_cipher = AES(is_encrypt=True, key=self.enc_key, iv=manifest_nonce.to_bytes(16, byteorder='big'))
self.nonce_manager = NonceManager(self.repository, self.enc_cipher, manifest_nonce)
self.dec_cipher = AES(is_encrypt=False, key=self.enc_key)
class Passphrase(str):
@classmethod
def _env_passphrase(cls, env_var, default=None):
passphrase = os.environ.get(env_var, default)
if passphrase is not None:
return cls(passphrase)
@classmethod
def env_passphrase(cls, default=None):
return cls._env_passphrase('BORG_PASSPHRASE', default)
@classmethod
def env_new_passphrase(cls, default=None):
return cls._env_passphrase('BORG_NEW_PASSPHRASE', default)
@classmethod
def getpass(cls, prompt):
return cls(getpass.getpass(prompt))
@classmethod
def verification(cls, passphrase):
msg = 'Do you want your passphrase to be displayed for verification? [yN]: '
if yes(msg, retry_msg=msg, invalid_msg='Invalid answer, try again.',
retry=True, env_var_override='BORG_DISPLAY_PASSPHRASE'):
print('Your passphrase (between double-quotes): "%s"' % passphrase,
file=sys.stderr)
print('Make sure the passphrase displayed above is exactly what you wanted.',
file=sys.stderr)
try:
passphrase.encode('ascii')
except UnicodeEncodeError:
print('Your passphrase (UTF-8 encoding in hex): %s' %
bin_to_hex(passphrase.encode('utf-8')),
file=sys.stderr)
print('As you have a non-ASCII passphrase, it is recommended to keep the UTF-8 encoding in hex together with the passphrase at a safe place.',
file=sys.stderr)
@classmethod
def new(cls, allow_empty=False):
passphrase = cls.env_new_passphrase()
if passphrase is not None:
return passphrase
passphrase = cls.env_passphrase()
if passphrase is not None:
return passphrase
for retry in range(1, 11):
passphrase = cls.getpass('Enter new passphrase: ')
if allow_empty or passphrase:
passphrase2 = cls.getpass('Enter same passphrase again: ')
if passphrase == passphrase2:
cls.verification(passphrase)
logger.info('Remember your passphrase. Your data will be inaccessible without it.')
return passphrase
else:
print('Passphrases do not match', file=sys.stderr)
else:
print('Passphrase must not be blank', file=sys.stderr)
else:
raise PasswordRetriesExceeded
def __repr__(self):
return '<Passphrase "***hidden***">'
def kdf(self, salt, iterations, length):
return pbkdf2_hmac('sha256', self.encode('utf-8'), salt, iterations, length)
class PassphraseKey(ID_HMAC_SHA_256, AESKeyBase):
# This mode was killed in borg 1.0, see: https://github.com/borgbackup/borg/issues/97
# Reasons:
# - you can never ever change your passphrase for existing repos.
# - you can never ever use a different iterations count for existing repos.
# "Killed" means:
# - there is no automatic dispatch to this class via type byte
# - --encryption=passphrase is an invalid argument now
# This class is kept for a while to support migration from passphrase to repokey mode.
TYPE = 0x01
NAME = 'passphrase'
ARG_NAME = None
STORAGE = KeyBlobStorage.NO_STORAGE
iterations = 100000 # must not be changed ever!
@classmethod
def create(cls, repository, args):
key = cls(repository)
logger.warning('WARNING: "passphrase" mode is unsupported since borg 1.0.')
passphrase = Passphrase.new(allow_empty=False)
key.init(repository, passphrase)
return key
@classmethod
def detect(cls, repository, manifest_data):
prompt = 'Enter passphrase for %s: ' % repository._location.canonical_path()
key = cls(repository)
passphrase = Passphrase.env_passphrase()
if passphrase is None:
passphrase = Passphrase.getpass(prompt)
for retry in range(1, 3):
key.init(repository, passphrase)
try:
key.decrypt(None, manifest_data)
num_blocks = num_aes_blocks(len(manifest_data) - 41)
key.init_ciphers(key.extract_nonce(manifest_data) + num_blocks)
key._passphrase = passphrase
return key
except IntegrityError:
passphrase = Passphrase.getpass(prompt)
else:
raise PasswordRetriesExceeded
def change_passphrase(self):
class ImmutablePassphraseError(Error):
"""The passphrase for this encryption key type can't be changed."""
raise ImmutablePassphraseError
def init(self, repository, passphrase):
self.init_from_random_data(passphrase.kdf(repository.id, self.iterations, 100))
self.init_ciphers()
self.tam_required = False
class KeyfileKeyBase(AESKeyBase):
@classmethod
def detect(cls, repository, manifest_data):
key = cls(repository)
target = key.find_key()
prompt = 'Enter passphrase for key %s: ' % target
passphrase = Passphrase.env_passphrase()
if passphrase is None:
passphrase = Passphrase()
if not key.load(target, passphrase):
for retry in range(0, 3):
passphrase = Passphrase.getpass(prompt)
if key.load(target, passphrase):
break
else:
raise PasswordRetriesExceeded
else:
if not key.load(target, passphrase):
raise PassphraseWrong
num_blocks = num_aes_blocks(len(manifest_data) - 41)
key.init_ciphers(key.extract_nonce(manifest_data) + num_blocks)
key._passphrase = passphrase
return key
def find_key(self):
raise NotImplementedError
def load(self, target, passphrase):
raise NotImplementedError
def _load(self, key_data, passphrase):
cdata = a2b_base64(key_data)
data = self.decrypt_key_file(cdata, passphrase)
if data:
data = msgpack.unpackb(data)
key = Key(internal_dict=data)
if key.version != 1:
raise IntegrityError('Invalid key file header')
self.repository_id = key.repository_id
self.enc_key = key.enc_key
self.enc_hmac_key = key.enc_hmac_key
self.id_key = key.id_key
self.chunk_seed = key.chunk_seed
self.tam_required = key.get('tam_required', tam_required(self.repository))
return True
return False
def decrypt_key_file(self, data, passphrase):
data = msgpack.unpackb(data)
enc_key = EncryptedKey(internal_dict=data)
assert enc_key.version == 1
assert enc_key.algorithm == 'sha256'
key = passphrase.kdf(enc_key.salt, enc_key.iterations, 32)
data = AES(is_encrypt=False, key=key).decrypt(enc_key.data)
if hmac_sha256(key, data) == enc_key.hash:
return data
def encrypt_key_file(self, data, passphrase):
salt = os.urandom(32)
iterations = PBKDF2_ITERATIONS
key = passphrase.kdf(salt, iterations, 32)
hash = hmac_sha256(key, data)
cdata = AES(is_encrypt=True, key=key).encrypt(data)
enc_key = EncryptedKey(
version=1,
salt=salt,
iterations=iterations,
algorithm='sha256',
hash=hash,
data=cdata,
)
return msgpack.packb(enc_key.as_dict())
def _save(self, passphrase):
key = Key(
version=1,
repository_id=self.repository_id,
enc_key=self.enc_key,
enc_hmac_key=self.enc_hmac_key,
id_key=self.id_key,
chunk_seed=self.chunk_seed,
tam_required=self.tam_required,
)
data = self.encrypt_key_file(msgpack.packb(key.as_dict()), passphrase)
key_data = '\n'.join(textwrap.wrap(b2a_base64(data).decode('ascii')))
return key_data
def change_passphrase(self, passphrase=None):
if passphrase is None:
passphrase = Passphrase.new(allow_empty=True)
self.save(self.target, passphrase)
@classmethod
def create(cls, repository, args):
passphrase = Passphrase.new(allow_empty=True)
key = cls(repository)
key.repository_id = repository.id
key.init_from_random_data()
key.init_ciphers()
target = key.get_new_target(args)
key.save(target, passphrase)
logger.info('Key in "%s" created.' % target)
logger.info('Keep this key safe. Your data will be inaccessible without it.')
return key
def save(self, target, passphrase):
raise NotImplementedError
def get_new_target(self, args):
raise NotImplementedError
class KeyfileKey(ID_HMAC_SHA_256, KeyfileKeyBase):
TYPE = 0x00
NAME = 'key file'
ARG_NAME = 'keyfile'
STORAGE = KeyBlobStorage.KEYFILE
FILE_ID = 'BORG_KEY'
def sanity_check(self, filename, id):
file_id = self.FILE_ID.encode() + b' '
repo_id = hexlify(id)
with open(filename, 'rb') as fd:
# we do the magic / id check in binary mode to avoid stumbling over
# decoding errors if somebody has binary files in the keys dir for some reason.
if fd.read(len(file_id)) != file_id:
raise KeyfileInvalidError(self.repository._location.canonical_path(), filename)
if fd.read(len(repo_id)) != repo_id:
raise KeyfileMismatchError(self.repository._location.canonical_path(), filename)
return filename
def find_key(self):
id = self.repository.id
keyfile = os.environ.get('BORG_KEY_FILE')
if keyfile:
return self.sanity_check(keyfile, id)
keys_dir = get_keys_dir()
for name in os.listdir(keys_dir):
filename = os.path.join(keys_dir, name)
try:
return self.sanity_check(filename, id)
except (KeyfileInvalidError, KeyfileMismatchError):
pass
raise KeyfileNotFoundError(self.repository._location.canonical_path(), get_keys_dir())
def get_new_target(self, args):
keyfile = os.environ.get('BORG_KEY_FILE')
if keyfile:
return keyfile
filename = args.location.to_key_filename()
path = filename
i = 1
while os.path.exists(path):
i += 1
path = filename + '.%d' % i
return path
def load(self, target, passphrase):
with open(target, 'r') as fd:
key_data = ''.join(fd.readlines()[1:])
success = self._load(key_data, passphrase)
if success:
self.target = target
return success
def save(self, target, passphrase):
key_data = self._save(passphrase)
with SaveFile(target) as fd:
fd.write('%s %s\n' % (self.FILE_ID, bin_to_hex(self.repository_id)))
fd.write(key_data)
fd.write('\n')
self.target = target
class RepoKey(ID_HMAC_SHA_256, KeyfileKeyBase):
TYPE = 0x03
NAME = 'repokey'
ARG_NAME = 'repokey'
STORAGE = KeyBlobStorage.REPO
def find_key(self):
loc = self.repository._location.canonical_path()
try:
self.repository.load_key()
return loc
except configparser.NoOptionError:
raise RepoKeyNotFoundError(loc) from None
def get_new_target(self, args):
return self.repository
def load(self, target, passphrase):
# what we get in target is just a repo location, but we already have the repo obj:
target = self.repository
key_data = target.load_key()
key_data = key_data.decode('utf-8') # remote repo: msgpack issue #99, getting bytes
success = self._load(key_data, passphrase)
if success:
self.target = target
return success
def save(self, target, passphrase):
key_data = self._save(passphrase)
key_data = key_data.encode('utf-8') # remote repo: msgpack issue #99, giving bytes
target.save_key(key_data)
self.target = target
class Blake2KeyfileKey(ID_BLAKE2b_256, KeyfileKey):
TYPE = 0x04
NAME = 'key file BLAKE2b'
ARG_NAME = 'keyfile-blake2'
STORAGE = KeyBlobStorage.KEYFILE
FILE_ID = 'BORG_KEY'
MAC = blake2b_256
class Blake2RepoKey(ID_BLAKE2b_256, RepoKey):
TYPE = 0x05
NAME = 'repokey BLAKE2b'
ARG_NAME = 'repokey-blake2'
STORAGE = KeyBlobStorage.REPO
MAC = blake2b_256
class AuthenticatedKey(ID_BLAKE2b_256, RepoKey):
TYPE = 0x06
NAME = 'authenticated BLAKE2b'
ARG_NAME = 'authenticated'
STORAGE = KeyBlobStorage.REPO
def encrypt(self, chunk):
data = self.compressor.compress(chunk)
return b''.join([self.TYPE_STR, data])
def decrypt(self, id, data, decompress=True):
if data[0] != self.TYPE:
raise IntegrityError('Chunk %s: Invalid envelope' % bin_to_hex(id))
payload = memoryview(data)[1:]
if not decompress:
return payload
data = self.decompress(payload)
self.assert_id(id, data)
return data
AVAILABLE_KEY_TYPES = (
PlaintextKey,
PassphraseKey,
KeyfileKey, RepoKey,
Blake2KeyfileKey, Blake2RepoKey, AuthenticatedKey,
)
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