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https://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/EVP_aes_256_cbc.html EVP_DecryptInit_ex(), EVP_DecryptUpdate() and EVP_DecryptFinal_ex() are the corresponding decryption operations. EVP_DecryptFinal() will return an error code if padding is enabled and the final block is not correctly formatted. The parameters and restrictions are identical to the encryption operations except that if padding is enabled the decrypted data buffer out passed to EVP_DecryptUpdate() should have sufficient room for (inl + cipher_block_size) bytes unless the cipher block size is 1 in which case inl bytes is sufficient. I doubt this is correct, but let's rather be defensive here.
173 lines
6.1 KiB
Cython
173 lines
6.1 KiB
Cython
"""A thin OpenSSL wrapper
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This could be replaced by PyCrypto or something similar when the performance
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of their PBKDF2 implementation is comparable to the OpenSSL version.
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"""
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from libc.stdlib cimport malloc, free
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API_VERSION = 2
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cdef extern from "openssl/rand.h":
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int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
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cdef extern from "openssl/evp.h":
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ctypedef struct EVP_MD:
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pass
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ctypedef struct EVP_CIPHER:
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pass
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ctypedef struct EVP_CIPHER_CTX:
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unsigned char *iv
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pass
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ctypedef struct ENGINE:
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pass
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const EVP_MD *EVP_sha256()
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const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_ctr()
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void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *a)
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void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *a)
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int EVP_EncryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, ENGINE *impl,
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const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv)
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int EVP_DecryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, ENGINE *impl,
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const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv)
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int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
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const unsigned char *in_, int inl)
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int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
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const unsigned char *in_, int inl)
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int EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
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int EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
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int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(const char *password, int passwordlen,
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const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
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const EVP_MD *digest,
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int keylen, unsigned char *out)
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import struct
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_int = struct.Struct('>I')
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_long = struct.Struct('>Q')
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bytes_to_int = lambda x, offset=0: _int.unpack_from(x, offset)[0]
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bytes_to_long = lambda x, offset=0: _long.unpack_from(x, offset)[0]
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long_to_bytes = lambda x: _long.pack(x)
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def num_aes_blocks(length):
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"""Return the number of AES blocks required to encrypt/decrypt *length* bytes of data.
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Note: this is only correct for modes without padding, like AES-CTR.
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"""
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return (length + 15) // 16
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def pbkdf2_sha256(password, salt, iterations, size):
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"""Password based key derivation function 2 (RFC2898)
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"""
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cdef unsigned char *key = <unsigned char *>malloc(size)
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if not key:
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raise MemoryError
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try:
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rv = PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(password, len(password), salt, len(salt), iterations, EVP_sha256(), size, key)
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if not rv:
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raise Exception('PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC failed')
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return key[:size]
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finally:
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free(key)
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def get_random_bytes(n):
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"""Return n cryptographically strong pseudo-random bytes
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"""
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cdef unsigned char *buf = <unsigned char *>malloc(n)
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if not buf:
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raise MemoryError
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try:
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if RAND_bytes(buf, n) < 1:
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raise Exception('RAND_bytes failed')
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return buf[:n]
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finally:
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free(buf)
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cdef class AES:
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"""A thin wrapper around the OpenSSL EVP cipher API
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"""
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cdef EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx
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cdef int is_encrypt
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def __cinit__(self, is_encrypt, key, iv=None):
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&self.ctx)
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self.is_encrypt = is_encrypt
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# Set cipher type and mode
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cipher_mode = EVP_aes_256_ctr()
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if self.is_encrypt:
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if not EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&self.ctx, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, NULL):
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raise Exception('EVP_EncryptInit_ex failed')
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else: # decrypt
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if not EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&self.ctx, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, NULL):
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raise Exception('EVP_DecryptInit_ex failed')
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self.reset(key, iv)
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def __dealloc__(self):
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&self.ctx)
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def reset(self, key=None, iv=None):
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cdef const unsigned char *key2 = NULL
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cdef const unsigned char *iv2 = NULL
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if key:
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key2 = key
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if iv:
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iv2 = iv
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# Initialise key and IV
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if self.is_encrypt:
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if not EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&self.ctx, NULL, NULL, key2, iv2):
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raise Exception('EVP_EncryptInit_ex failed')
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else: # decrypt
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if not EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&self.ctx, NULL, NULL, key2, iv2):
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raise Exception('EVP_DecryptInit_ex failed')
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@property
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def iv(self):
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return self.ctx.iv[:16]
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def encrypt(self, data):
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cdef int inl = len(data)
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cdef int ctl = 0
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cdef int outl = 0
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# note: modes that use padding, need up to one extra AES block (16b)
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cdef unsigned char *out = <unsigned char *>malloc(inl+16)
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if not out:
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raise MemoryError
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try:
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if not EVP_EncryptUpdate(&self.ctx, out, &outl, data, inl):
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raise Exception('EVP_EncryptUpdate failed')
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ctl = outl
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if not EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&self.ctx, out+ctl, &outl):
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raise Exception('EVP_EncryptFinal failed')
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ctl += outl
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return out[:ctl]
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finally:
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free(out)
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def decrypt(self, data):
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cdef int inl = len(data)
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cdef int ptl = 0
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cdef int outl = 0
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# note: modes that use padding, need up to one extra AES block (16b).
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# This is what the openssl docs say. I am not sure this is correct,
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# but OTOH it will not cause any harm if our buffer is a little bigger.
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cdef unsigned char *out = <unsigned char *>malloc(inl+16)
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if not out:
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raise MemoryError
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try:
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if not EVP_DecryptUpdate(&self.ctx, out, &outl, data, inl):
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raise Exception('EVP_DecryptUpdate failed')
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ptl = outl
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if EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&self.ctx, out+ptl, &outl) <= 0:
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# this error check is very important for modes with padding or
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# authentication. for them, a failure here means corrupted data.
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# CTR mode does not use padding nor authentication.
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raise Exception('EVP_DecryptFinal failed')
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ptl += outl
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return out[:ptl]
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finally:
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free(out)
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