Replacing the internals should make the implementation faster
and simpler since the order tracking is done by the `OrderedDict`.
Furthermore, this commit adds type hints to `LRUCache` and
renames the `upd` method to `replace` to make its use more clear.
Paths are not always sanitized when creating an archive and,
more importantly, never when extracting one. The following example
shows how this can be used to attempt to write a file outside the
extraction directory:
$ echo abcdef | borg create -r ~/borg/a --stdin-name x/../../../../../etc/shadow archive-1 -
$ borg list -r ~/borg/a archive-1
-rw-rw---- root root 7 Sun, 2022-10-23 19:14:27 x/../../../../../etc/shadow
$ mkdir borg/target
$ cd borg/target
$ borg extract -r ~/borg/a archive-1
x/../../../../../etc/shadow: makedirs: [Errno 13] Permission denied: '/home/user/borg/target/x/../../../../../etc'
Note that Borg tries to extract the file to /etc/shadow and the
permission error is a result of the user not having access.
This patch ensures file names are sanitized before archiving.
As for files extracted from the archive, paths are sanitized
by making all paths relative, removing '.' elements, and removing
superfluous slashes (as in '//'). '..' elements, however, are
rejected outright. The reasoning here is that it is easy to start
a path with './' or insert a '//' by accident (e.g. via --stdin-name
or import-tar). '..', however, seem unlikely to be the result
of an accident and could indicate a tampered repository.
With paths being sanitized as they are being read, this "errors"
will be corrected during the `borg transfer` required when upgrading
to Borg 2. Hence, the sanitation, when reading the archive,
can be removed once support for reading v1 repositories is dropped.
V2 repository will not contain non-sanitized paths. Of course,
a check for absolute paths and '..' elements needs to kept in
place to detect tempered archives.
I recommend treating this as a security issue. I see the following
cases where extracting a file outside the extraction path could
constitute a security risk:
a) When extraction is done as a different user than archive
creation. The user that created the archive may be able to
get a file overwritten as a different user.
b) When the archive is created on one host and extracted on
another. The user that created the archive may be able to
get a file overwritten on another host.
c) When an archive is created and extracted after a OS reinstall.
When a host is suspected compromised, it is common to reinstall
(or set up a new machine), extract the backups and then evaluate
their integrity. A user that manipulates the archive before such
a reinstall may be able to get a file overwritten outside the
extraction path and may evade integrity checks.
Notably absent is the creation and extraction on the same host as
the same user. In such case, an adversary must be assumed to be able
to replace any file directly.
This also (partially) fixes#7099.
shutting down logging is problematic as it is global
and we do multi-threaded execution, e.g. in tests.
thus, rather just flush the important loggers and keep
them alive.
server (listening) side:
borg serve --socket # default location
borg serve --socket=/path/to/socket
client side:
borg -r socket:///path/to/repo create ...
borg --socket=/path/to/socket -r socket:///path/to/repo ...
served connections:
- for ssh: proto: one connection
- for socket: proto: many connections (one after the other)
The socket has user and group permissions (770).
skip socket tests on win32, they hang infinitely, until
github CI terminates them after 60 minutes.
socket tests: use unique socket name
don't use the standard / default socket name, otherwise tests
running in parallel would interfere with each other by using
the same socket / the same borg serve process.
write a .pid file, clean up .pid and .sock file at exit
add stderr print for accepted/finished socket connection
- tears down logging (so no new log output is generated afterwards)
- sends all queued log output
- then returns
also: make stdin_fd / stdout_fd instance variables
